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Preparing for a COMAH inspection: what inspectors actually trace

A COMAH inspection is not a document review. It's a test of whether the safety management system your safety report describes actually runs — on the plant, on nights, when nobody's preparing for a visit. What gets traced, what gets asked, and what ready looks like.

Reference material, kept current · last reviewed 30 July 2026 · next scheduled review January 2027

What a COMAH inspection is

The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015 — Great Britain's implementation of the Seveso III Directive — put one duty above all the paperwork: the operator must take all measures necessary to prevent major accidents and limit their consequences. Upper-tier establishments describe those measures in a safety report; lower-tier establishments in a major accident prevention policy. Inspections are carried out by the Competent Authority — the Health and Safety Executive working jointly with the relevant environment agency — on a planned programme.

Here is the framing that makes preparation make sense: the safety report is a claim, and the site is the test. The report says a safety management system exists — that checks happen, that abnormal conditions are managed, that changes are controlled, that people are competent. The inspection exists to find out whether those sentences are true on a wet Tuesday night shift.

The show-me culture

The style of modern COMAH intervention is operational verification, not document review. Inspectors go to the plant. They ask the operator at the panel, not only the manager in the meeting room — and an operator who describes the actual practice, confidently, is worth more than any procedure binder. They pick a claim from the safety report and follow it down: name a measure, then “show me it running — last month, not last audit.”

This is why preparation-as-an-event fails. A site that scrambles to assemble evidence for a visit is demonstrating, in real time, that the evidence isn't produced naturally by its operations — which is itself a finding about the safety management system. The only preparation that works is running, every week, in a way that would survive an unannounced trace.

What gets traced

A trace starts at a sentence in the safety report and ends at operational reality. The trails inspectors walk most often:

  • Scheduled checks → did they happen? The report says operating rounds and routine checks monitor the plant. Show the schedule, show completions against it — and show what the gaps look like, because a record with no visible gaps invites the harder question of whether it can show gaps at all.
  • Abnormal findings → what followed? An operator flagged something. Where did it go, who judged it, what happened next? A warning that surfaced only after the failure it predicted is the classic incident-report sentence, and inspectors read incident reports.
  • Defeated protection → who knows, who authorised, what's watching? Every plant sometimes runs with a device inhibited or bypassed. The question is whether that state is declared, authorised, compensated and time-bounded — or discovered. Ask any site to list every defeat live right now, with authorisations; the speed of the answer is the finding.
  • Changes → were they controlled? The round that was modified, the procedure that was updated, the trip setting that moved: who changed it, on whose authority, and does the record show it?
  • People → competent and attributable?Who carried out the check matters as much as the check. Records that can't say who — or that show leavers still holding access — undermine everything else they claim.

Questions to expect

Rehearse these — not the answers, the evidence behind them:

  • “Show me the last month of rounds on this unit — and the ones that didn't happen.”
  • “List every protective device currently defeated, who authorised each, and what's compensating.”
  • “This reading was flagged abnormal in March. Walk me to its resolution.”
  • “Who changed this check's frequency, when, and on what basis?”
  • “How do I know this record hasn't been tidied since it was written?”
  • “Ask that operator what they do when something looks wrong — then show me the record agreeing with them.”
The last one is the whole game. When the operator's account and the record tell the same story unprompted, the safety management system is real. When they diverge, one of them is fiction — and the inspector gets to decide which.

What ready looks like

Ready is a set of properties, not a binder. Evidence that survives a trace is:

  • Retrievable in minutes.“We'll get back to you” is an answer about the system, not the question.
  • Honest about gaps.A missed check recorded as missed is a functioning system having a bad day. A blank that could be anything is a system that can't tell the difference.
  • Attributable. Who did it, who judged it, who authorised it — including who could have touched the record.
  • Tamper-evident. Corrections visible as corrections, never silent replacements.
  • Produced naturally. The daily exhaust of running well — not an artefact assembled for the visit.

Note what's absent from that list: any particular technology. A disciplined paper system can hold these properties, at growing cost in effort; an undisciplined digital system holds none of them. The properties are the standard — pursue them in whatever medium your site can sustain.

Straight talk

Straight talk

This article is operational guidance, not legal advice, and it doesn't substitute for the Competent Authority's own published guidance. Your safety report defines your measures; your site decides how to evidence them; the regulator alone decides whether that satisfies the duty. No tool, no template and no software — ours included — makes a site compliant or certifies anything.

Questions we actually get asked

Do inspectors accept digital records?
Inspectors are medium-neutral: they care whether the record is retrievable, attributable, complete and trustworthy, not whether it lives on paper or a screen. A disciplined paper system beats a sloppy digital one. What changes with the medium is how hard those properties are to maintain — and how quickly you can produce twelve months of history when asked.
Are lower-tier sites inspected too?
Yes. The safety report is an upper-tier duty, but lower-tier establishments carry the same general duty to take all measures necessary, must maintain a major accident prevention policy, and are inspected against it. The evidence questions in this article apply at both tiers; the paperwork burden differs, the operational reality being tested does not.
How often do COMAH inspections happen?
The Competent Authority plans interventions on a programme, weighted by tier, hazard and the site's own performance — there is no single fixed interval. The practical consequence: you don't prepare for an inspection date, you run so that any date would be fine. Evidence you have to assemble specially is evidence the system isn't producing naturally.
What happens if the evidence doesn't hold up?
Findings and required actions at minimum; improvement or prohibition notices where the gap is serious. But the deeper cost is credibility: once an inspector finds one claim in the safety report that doesn't survive contact with the plant, every other claim gets tested harder. The reverse is also true — early questions answered cleanly, with evidence, change the tone of everything that follows.